



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6 December 1979



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John H. Waller  
Inspector General

SUBJECT: Soviet Attitude Toward Iran

1. I am attaching a paper which represents an effort to analyze the Soviet attitude and strategy toward Iran.

2. In today's issue of Pravda, the Central Committee of the Soviet Union accused the United States of "crude military and political pressure" against Iran. It described the situation as one which "threatens to become one of the most serious international incidents since World War II."

3. The attached paper concludes that direct military intervention in Iran by the U.S. would provoke retaliatory intervention by the USSR and create a situation potentially more damaging to U.S. policy than that which faces us now. It also concludes that Soviet tactics will, for the time being, call for support of Khomeini. The Tudeh Party will accordingly continue its popular front stance in support of Khomeini.

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John H. Waller: JHWALLER:hj R1252 6 Dec 79

Attachment - 1

cc: DDCI w/att  
Director, NFAC w/att  
NIO/Warning w/att  
NIO/Middle East w/att  
DDO w/att  
Chief, NE Division w/att

Distribution:

Orig w/att - Addressee

1 w/att - DDCI

1 w/att - Director, NFAC

1 w/att - NIO/Middle East

1 w/att - NIO/Warning

1 w/att - DDO

1 w/att - Chief, NE Division

1 w/att - IG Subject (JHW Soft File)

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ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POSITION REGARDING IRAN

Any analysis of the internal dynamics of Iran and where they will lead that country is important but is necessarily incomplete unless probable foreign actions vis-a-vis Iran are factored in. Perhaps most important in this respect are the plans and intentions of the Soviet Union. An intelligent guess of how the Soviet Union regards Iran can, to some extent, be determined from:

- a. Its historical record in Iran, reflecting certain constant geopolitical imperatives.
- b. Its current diplomatic and public positions, not only regarding Iran but regarding the entire Middle East.
- c. The activities of its principal indigenous instrument, the Tudeh Party of Iran.

An estimate of how successful the Soviets will be in pursuing their objectives in Iran presents another problem, one that must be analyzed in the context of how other countries, particularly the U.S., will act or react.

Attached for ease of reference is a brief summary history of Russian relations with Iran. It is interesting to review this, as it suggests certain historical constants in Russian policy toward Iran.

Russia, Czarist or Soviet, has always been sensitive to its border areas. Through instincts of defense, it has consistently sought controlled buffer zones along its perimeter. Certainly, this has been apparent in the case of Iran which shares borders with some of the USSR's ethnic minorities. The USSR historically has also sought access to the Persian Gulf for geopolitical reasons -- warm water ports, access to the Indian Ocean, etc. With the advent of the Communist Revolution in 1918, Russian foreign policy has included an ideological content, as well. Since the 1920 Baku Conference of the Peoples of the East, in which Lenin's Asian thesis was reaffirmed, Iran has been a principal Communist target and has been held up as a classic prototype of feudal monarchial reaction. As the International eroded and splintered, and as Russian nationalism progressively took precedence over Communist internationalism, ideological objectives have become less important to Moscow, but the Persian Tudeh Party has become no less important as an instrument of Soviet policy and a method of

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manipulating Persian politics, particularly when played in concert with direct diplomacy and, when possible, direct pressure. Another constant is Persia as an historical arena in which Russia has classically confronted other major powers -- Great Britain up to World War II and the U.S. afterward.

Today the objectives of Soviet policy toward Iran have been further augmented in the past few years by its recognition that, like the U.S., it is no longer self sufficient in oil. Persian Gulf oil and gas have become commodities which lend special urgency to the USSR's more traditional, geopolitical objectives in the Middle East. The USSR, too, must see itself as a beneficiary of U.S. policy failures in Iran, just as it has been gladdened by U.S. policy defeats elsewhere in the Middle East. Our loss is, by definition, Soviet gain in the balance of power equations of super-power competition. But, more specifically, the USSR sees our defeat in Iran has having a vital effect on our standing throughout the third world. If Saudi Arabia and its flanking Gulf Sheikdoms contain the ultimate prize of oil, the world of Islam holds the key to the third world. Already offended by our post-Camp David position in the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Arab world now sees in Iran a manifestation of U.S. weakness.

The USSR first reacted to Khomeini with some uncertainty. If, at first, the Soviets suffered with us as the object of Khomeini's xenophobia, it now enjoys seeing this xenophobia focused on the U.S. Whatever Soviet basic attitudes toward Khomeini may be, the Kremlin probably views his wrecking of the U.S. position as a helpful development. The USSR may, to some extent, fear that Khomeini's excesses could provoke the U.S. to actions leading to an unwanted confrontation at this time. It is interesting in this connection that as early as 19 November 1978, at the outset of the Iranian revolution, Soviet President Brezhnev warned the U.S. that "any interference, especially military, in the affairs of Iran, a state which directly borders the Soviet Union, would be regarded as affecting its security." The Soviet news agency TASS said on 4 December 1979 that the use of force by the U.S. against Iran would result in "the most dangerous consequences." Certainly, in the longer run, however, the USSR must see as the ultimate outcome of Khomeini's rule, a disintegration of Iran, providing the USSR with new opportunities to realize long-sought goals. How the USSR will try to take advantage of these opportunities and what we can do about it are key questions confronting us.

Russia has traditionally attempted to gain influence in Iran by two techniques:

- (1) Provincial domination in the northern, adjacent provinces of Iran, and

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(2) Seizure of control of the central government in Tehran.

With the absence of an effective army, deep-seated ethnic drives for autonomy or independence have reasserted themselves. The Kurds are now in revolt, Azerbaijan has been the scene of frequent anti-Khomeini disturbances. The Turkmans and Baluchis, like the Kurds and Azerbaijanis, have boycotted the Constitutional Referendum, the Arabs of Khuzistan are hostile to Tehran, and the Turkish Qashqais' leadership, enjoying a new autonomy under Khomeini, are making longer-range plans to increase their power and autonomy, should Khomeini fail.

One-third of Iran's population is Azerbaijani Turks. This ethnic group has been a classical instrument of Soviet policy and control in Iran. Ethnically akin to Soviet Azerbaijanis, and traditionally antagonistic toward Tehran, they are probably still today vulnerable to Soviet incitement. It must be assumed that the pro-Soviet Tudeh is laying plans to control an autonomous Azerbaijan. This time, unlike 1945, the Tudeh may prefer, however, to operate behind the facade of a popular front provincial movement, so as to avoid subjecting the USSR to the kind of xenophobic outbursts throughout Iran now being suffered by the U.S. But should the U.S. attempt any sustained military action in Iran, the USSR would not scruple to occupy Azerbaijan as an act of retaliation with a semblance of legal sanction through the 1921 Treaty.

In addition to strengthening its underground machinery in Azerbaijan and perhaps in Gilan (Resht) and Mazandaran, as well, the Soviets are surely nourishing the Tudeh Party in Khuzistan, where it has been long entrenched in the oil workers' union. It is significant that before Khomeini returned triumphantly to Tehran from Paris, he sent emissaries to Khuzistan to assure leftist union support and to forestall sabotage of this vital source of Iranian revenue by a hostile Tudeh.

In Tehran, it has been obvious that the Tudeh has been pursuing once more the classic Communist "popular front" tactic. The Tudeh has been riding the Khomeini bandwagon. While the militant Fedayin has assumed an anti-Khomeini posture and has tested its strength on the street, the Tudeh has not swerved from its support of Khomeini. This in itself is a good indication of Moscow's tactical policy toward Iran's leader.

The posture of the Tudeh would indicate that the Soviets do not believe it is time to challenge Khomeini. So long as Tudeh

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is permitted to function and build its strength, and the Ayatollah continues to weaken U.S. influence in Iran and throughout the Middle East, the advantages of popular front tactics are obvious.

The Fedayin is today one of Iran's most enigmatic groups. It is unfortunate that we know so little about it. Its street strength is impressive and its Marxism is not visibly linked to Moscow. There is a body of thought that it is, however, heavily penetrated by Moscow. It is also difficult to understand the Mujahadin and where it fits into the scheme of things. But its apparent strength makes it also worthy of our attention. Whether it, too, contains pro-Moscow penetrations is difficult to say on the basis of available evidence.

What must be considered in assessing Moscow's leverage in the left is the phenomenal strength, consistency of line, apparent affluence and consistency of methodology exhibited by anti-Shah groups in Europe and the U.S. for the past 25 years. This phenomenon predates the rise of Qadhafi, the PLO and Khomeini. Who or what controlled this movement and kept it alive and vibrant for so long is still a mystery. By a process of elimination, a case can be made that the USSR (or one of its Eastern European surrogates) has been behind it.

If it can be assumed that the wages of Khomeini's erratic governing will include growing unemployment, then it must also be assumed that the strong union-oriented Tudeh may be beneficiary of this situation. Alone, or in coalition with other Marxist groups, the Tudeh would at least seem to be in a position to bid for power should anything untoward befall Khomeini or should he become vulnerable to overthrow, particularly if the nearby Soviets were to be willing to augment it by Iranian ethnic partisans imported from the USSR.

The issues which should be examined, however, are whether any secular left which inherits or seizes power from Khomeini can be nationalist, not pro-Soviet, and would a nationalist, leftist government endure without falling into the hands of pro-Moscow Marxists. But whatever instruments or tactics are used by the Soviets, there would seem to be a good chance that a situation analogous to that in Afghanistan could develop, in which Soviet control is achieved in the capital and some principal cities, though not in the southern provinces.

But before reaching an assumption that it is inevitable that Khomeini's power will erode enough to permit his overthrow, we

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should examine his strength. Clearly, his prestige is formidable. Clearly, he can now get an impressive crowd in the street and clearly, he has militia forces with some organizational capability. Above all, the common man in Iran, religious by nature, is fiercely loyal to him.

Also significant are his efforts now to create some kind of armed forces, more disciplined and better trained than the present motley militia. It is important to ascertain the extent of Palestinian assistance which is now or may be rendered to him. Ghotbzadeh's links to the Palestinians have always been strong, and reports of Palestinian combat groups entering Iran, if true, could significantly change the balance of street power in Tehran and other major big cities. The emergence of a Sunni Palestinian Janissary force would not be popular in Iran, where Arabs are held in disrepute, but a strong PLO training mission might be tolerated long enough for Khomeini to form a relatively respectable new Iran armed force out of the undisciplined devotees now providing him with street might. Such force, trusted by Khomeini, could be put in command of the remnant of Iran's army and Gendarmerie, as well as a "home guard" such as he has recently called for. In short, with time and assistance from somewhere -- Palestinian or Libyan -- Khomeini could provide himself with a defense framework adequate to protect him from leftist overthrow.

The best bellweather of Soviet intentions will be whether the Tudeh remains in a popular front mode and continues to support Khomeini. So long as this is the case, it can probably be assumed that either the Soviet Union finds that Khomeini's theocratic rule suits its purposes because of its hostility to U.S. interests and because the Tudeh can continue to flourish with an acceptable share of power for the time being, or Khomeini is simply too strong to be overthrown. Perhaps more important may be a Soviet perception that political action mounted from the West, such as Bakhtiar's movement, is threatening enough to require the Tudeh to bolster the Ayatollah.

Popular front tactics do not, of course, inhibit underlying revolutionary agitprop practices, thus the Tudeh will doubtless continue to organize underground, incite Azerbaijani provincial nationalism, and penetrate other political groups, left or right.

What would upset the present precarious equilibrium, in which the Soviets tacitly support Khomeini and the Tudeh continues popular front tactics while the U.S. remains immobile, would be sudden military action by the U.S. in Iran. Should the U.S.

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invade or occupy part of Iran, the Soviets would be presented with an irresistible opportunity to occupy the north, and probably Tehran, justifying its acts under the 1921 Treaty, in the interest of defending Iran and its own borders. Should the U.S. be the first aggressor, it is likely that we would reap a whirlwind; we would lose support in the third world, raise serious concern in Saudi Arabia, raise the tension point in the Arab-Israeli dispute, place severe strains on NATO and possibly kill SALT II. The Soviets, playing the role of Iran's savior and being in a better logistical position to sustain military occupation in north Iran, would be the gainer in this situation.

This presents us with a situation in which we're damned if we do and damned if we don't. If we take military action, we court foreign policy catastrophe. If we do nothing, we exhibit weakness and lose international prestige and respect. While both alternatives are uncomfortable, I believe the latter is preferable. Iran is not the place to directly confront the Soviets if we can help it.

Attachment - 1

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ATTACHMENT

The following historical sketch reviews long and consistent efforts by both Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union to extend its control and influence with Iran:

- 1724 -- Peter the Great temporarily occupied Iran's northern province of Gilan, bordering the Caspian. In his testament he wrote:

"Approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently, excite continual wars not only in Turkey but in Persia .... and in the decadence of Persia penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf .... advance as far as India which is the depot of the world. Arrived at this point we shall have no longer need of England's gold."

- 1796 -- Russo-Iran wars.
- 1800-1813 -- Russo-Iran wars, culminating in the Treaty of Galistan.
- 1826-1828 -- Russo-Iran wars resulting in Iran's loss of her Caucasian provinces to Russia. These campaigns culminated in the Treaty of Turkomanchai in 1828, pushing the frontier south to the Arras River and subjecting Iran to Russian political domination.
- 1881 -- The Turkoman tribes west of the Caspian were defeated as part of Russia's colonial advance into Central Asia. A Russo-Iranian agreement established the Atrek River as boundary between the two countries west of the Caspian.
- 1856 -- Iran, at Russian instigation, attacked Afghanistan, then an ally of



the British, and seized Herat, Afghanistan's major eastern city near the Iran frontier. This provoked Britain, always intent on guarding its approaches to India and always concerned by Russia's southward thrustings, to declare war on Iran.

- 1857 -- British landings in southern Iran, along the Gulf Coast, forced the Shah to sue for peace and abandon Herat. Russia's drive toward India was halted.
- 1872 -- British subject, Baron Julius de Reuter, acquired a comprehensive mineral agreement from Shah Nasir-el Din.

The Russians pressured the Shah to cancel the British concession, although the British and the Russians were awarded lesser concessions, leading to foreign domination of all of Iran's foreign resources.

Russian influence in the north of Iran was comprehensive. Burdening loans given to the profligate Shah made him beholden to the Czar; Russian troops were stationed in various places throughout north Iran.

- 1906 -- A revolution caused by Tehran's merchant class in which a few thousand merchants took bast in the British Embassy, a tradition of seeking safehaven or asylum in a foreign embassy, and issued an ultimatum to Shah Mozaffar-el-Din demanding he grant a Constitution. The British were considered the real backers of this movement.

Subsequent efforts by pro-Russian elements to abrogate the British-inspired Constitution and restore an absolute monarchy were foiled by the British who successfully manipulated the then-powerful Bakhtiari tribe to block Russian designs.

The Iran Democrats or Constitutionalists, however, turned against the British and

allied themselves with the rising colonial power of Imperial Germany.

- 1907 -- The alienation of Iranian Democrats against the British was prompted by a major British-Russian agreement, concluded in common response to German machinations in the Middle East. This resulted in the division of Iran into a Russian sphere of interest in the north and a British sphere of interest in the south.
- 1914-1918 -- World War I saw Britain and Russia allied in an effort to block German ambitions in the Caucasus. German secret agents intrigued behind the lines in Iran and Afghanistan. Of particular interest was the German agent, Wassmus, "the German Lawrence," who caused the Tangistani tribes in the Bushire area and the powerful Qashqai tribe in Fars to rebel. Wassmus, with his tribal forces, attacked Bushire and bottled up 800 British-Indian troops. The British were forced to divert forces from Mesopotamia to protect the oil fields and pipelines in Khuzistan from these tribal marauders.
- 1918 -- During the collapse of Czarist Russia, the British sent a short-lived expeditionary force to Baku to preempt the area from German occupation.
- 1919 -- The Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, forced on Iran by British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, who wished to guarantee British preeminence in an "independent" Iran, provided for British reorganization of the Iranian Army, as well as a host of British advisors to help run the country. This Treaty was, in fact, the climax of British influence in Iran. The Iranian Parliament in 1921 repudiated the Treaty at the instigation of a new strong man, Reza Khan, soon to crown himself Shah and founder of the Pahlevi dynasty. British troops were evacuated in May 1921.

-- 1920 -- Russian Baku, now under Bolshevik control, hosted the "First Congress" of the Peoples of the East, under the sponsorship of the Communist International. Here was articulated Lenin's famous contribution to the European-oriented doctrine of Marx. Revolution in Asia became a requisite adjunct to revolution in Russia and a necessary precursor to world revolution. Gregory Zinoviev, President of the Congress, presided over 1891 delegates from the East and declared war against foreign imperialists. At the climax of the meeting, he declared, "You who have met for the first time in a Congress of the Peoples of the East must here and now declare a true Holy War against the English .... robber-capitalist."

In retrospect, it became clear that Communist Russia had moved too fast in leading the still-conservative Moslem peoples. Zinoviev's attack on Islam and Bela Kun's ringing denunciation of monarchies could not be accepted by many of the delegates. But if this historic event did not then spark revolution in Asia, it clearly revealed that Communist Russia had not abandoned Czarist Russia's ambitions in the East, even though the motive may seem to have changed.

The place of Iran in Soviet eastern policy was articulated by Troyanovsky in Vostok-i-Revolutsia in 1918:

"A political situation favorable to democracy in Russia has an extraordinary importance for the emancipation of the entire Orient. All that is needed is an impulse from the outside, an external aid, an initiative.... This impulse....can come from our Russian revolutionaries through the intermediary of the Russian Moslems.... India is our principal objective. Persia is the only path open to India."

Here were echoes of Peter the Great. Only the mantle of policy had changed; the underlying geopolitical, economic imperative remained the same.

- 1920 -- An Islamic reformist movement, aimed at reactionary rule and foreign influences, sprang up in the Caspian province of Gilan, led by two Iranians, Kuchik Khan and Ekhsanulla Khan. Known as the Jangali (jungle) movement, it railed against British influence.

By 1920, the Soviets, who were on the verge of gaining control of the Caucasus, established contact with Kuchik Khan. Overcoming his religious scruples, Kuchik Khan made an agreement with the Soviets, in which a new "Soviet Republic of Gilan" was established. The key Commissariat of Interior was headed by a Soviet agent, Ja'afar Pishevari, destined to head a Soviet Azerbaijan puppet following World War II. It was not until more than a year later that the Iranian Army was able to reassert its authority in Gilan. Kuchik Khan was executed. That the Soviets permitted its puppet to die can probably be attributed to the fact that it did not want to prejudice Communist revolutions elsewhere in Asia by appearing to be an imperialist-style aggressor against Iran. The Soviets could either cultivate good relations with Iran's central government and, in so doing, eventually penetrate it, or simply occupy Iran's northern provinces, justifying its actions with unconvincing claims to be helping indigenous separatist movements. This is a choice the USSR perhaps faces today. But in 1921, it did not want to jeopardize Lenin's Asian thesis of revolution by taking the easy way out by aggression. Moreover, it did not want to provide Great Britain with a pretense to occupy the south of Iran.

Sheikh Khiaban, who had spent many years in the Russian Caucasus, fomented a revolt in Azerbaijan and established his "National Democratic Party." This group spurned Soviet

assistance, however, and soon succumbed to central government repression.

- 1921 -- On February 26, 1921, a Soviet-Iranian Treaty was concluded in Tehran. The key elements of this Treaty, which still has legal relevance today, despite Khomeini's unilateral repudiation of it, are found in Articles 5 and 6:

It prohibits the formation of any organization in Iran whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia.

It permits the prevention "by all means....the presence within their territories....of all armies or forces of a third party in cases in which the presence of such forces could be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other contracting party."

"If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia... and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace....Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed."

- 1922 -- Azerbaijan separatism erupted again in 1922 when "partisans of freedom" rose in revolt under one Lakhuti Khan. But this, too, collapsed when the new Pahlevi Shah resolutely suppressed it.

In the two decades following World War I, the Soviets were too concerned with internal

problems to pursue an aggressive program in Iran. Yet its doctrine of revolution, on one hand, and the more traditional Russian compulsion to secure its borders and its desire for a warm water port, on the other, kept the Russian issue very much alive, however quiescent or underground it may have been. Soviet theoreticians debated the significance of Reza Shah's accession to the throne. Was he simply another feudal monarch, or did he represent a form of social evolution into a semi-bourgeois phase?

The small Iranian Communist movements which traced its roots to the Caucasus, was, in the early stages, involved in union organization. By 1921, eleven workers' parties existed in Tehran, boasting a total membership of some 8000 laborers. Political progress was less impressive. Suleiman Mirza and Reza Rusta led a front party called the National Bloc. Recognizing its Communist coloration and Soviet link, the Bloc's more important members were arrested or killed, although Reza Rusta fled to Russia and lived to play an important part in the Tudeh Party's post-World War II trade union activities.

- 1927 -- Soviet intelligence (G.P.U.) became active in 1927 when its "legal" resident, George Agabekov, arrived in Tehran to take command of Soviet agents throughout northern Iran, who heretofore reported to Baku and Tiflis. Among other things, Agabekov kept a close eye on Armenian and Kurdish parties which exposed total independence of their minorities in the Soviet Caucasus. The British, too, were targets of the G.P.U. The American journalist, Vincent Sheean, who visited Iran in 1927, wrote:

"In Persia the Soviet Union interferes to an extent which would not be credible in Western Europe. Russian money pays for the most incongruous assortment of political movements,

popular upheavals, dynastic  
flurries, tribal agitations."

- 1928 -- As a result of a program adopted by the 6th Congress of the Comintern, the G.P.U. in Tehran was ordered to devote more time to tribal affairs in Iran and to work against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Khuzistan. These activities were to be henceforth most secret in nature. Thus the well-exposed Agabekov was replaced by one Triandophiloff.
- World War II -- The exigencies of World War II, with the grand alliance of the allies with the USSR, brought a new phase in Iran. By prior agreement, Soviet and British forces invaded Iran; the former from the north, the latter from the Gulf and Iraq. Soon thereafter, Reza Shah was exiled because of his pro-German proclivities and lack of cooperation. This left a power vacuum and a series of weak governments unable to cope with Iran's worsening economic problem. Iran's chaotic experiment with parliamentary democracy was signally unsuccessful.

A German fifth column in Iran included a group under Abwehr officer, Julius Schulze, who intrigued against the British with the Qashqai tribe in the south. In the spring of 1943, Nasser Khan and Khosro Khan Qashqai rebelled against the central government, inflicting a heavy defeat on the army.
- 1945 -- Immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union made a serious misjudgement. Taking advantage of its physical presence in north Iran, they fomented puppet independence movements in Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan. With strong backing by the U.S. Ambassador, the Iranian Government called the Soviet bluff and recaptured both delinquent provinces in 1946. The Soviets, unprepared for a confrontation with the U.S., did nothing to prevent the

Azerbaijan Democratic Government and the Kurdish Peoples Republic of Mahabad from being invaded by Iranian forces. The second Soviet mistake, hard on the heels of the first, was to pressure Prime Minister Qavam in 1946 to include three Communists in his cabinet and provide the Soviets with certain economic concessions. This caused the oil-minded British to intrigue against Qavam and stimulate the Qashqai tribe in the south to rise against the Iranian garrison in Shiraz and threatened seceding from the country. These tactics worked; Qavam bowed to Qashqai demands, fired his Tudeh ministers and permitted the parliament to repudiate the Soviet economic treaty granting them certain concessions. This put the Tudeh, as agents of the Soviets, out on a limb with no graceful way to re-enter respectable Iranian politics until the advent of Khomeini.

- 1952-1953 -- Having lost these early rounds in Iran and faced with an apparently determined U.S., the Soviet Union's next tactic was to throw the street organization of the Tudeh behind the fast-rising nationalist, Mossadegh. Not unlike Khomeini today, Mossadegh's act to nationalize the British oil concession attracted popular support. Needing street action -- demonstrations, etc. -- Mossadegh began to rely progressively more on the well-oiled machinery of the Tudeh. The more extremist he became, the more he relied on the Tudeh to give him the voice and organization he had to have. It had been the U.S. estimate, at the time, that Mossadegh, unschooled in the art of government administration and unstructured in political strategy, had been captured by the Tudeh. The Mossadegh (cum Tudeh, cum Soviet) cause seemed assured when the Shah fled the country. CIA-MI-6 political action in ousting Mossadegh succeeded when it was able, through key bazaar contacts, to marshal and incite street mobs to demonstrate for the Shah. Taking advantage of public shock at their monarch's flight from Iran, our mobs outclassed the Tudeh in the streets,



permitting the army to re-enter the scene and consolidate the victory. Again the Soviets had failed; they had moved too far, too fast. This time, however, the U.S. took advantage of the now-strengthened Shah, whose popular mandate had for the first time since he succeeded his exiled father been demonstrated. Twenty-five years of Pax-Pahlevi followed in which the Soviets watched as the U.S. stimulated a "northern tier" defense concept with CENTO. Under Nixon, the U.S. abandoned all pretenses of joint area defense in favor of using the Shah as the U.S. chosen instrument for Gulf stability. The Saudis, uneasy with Iranian supremacy in the Gulf, nonetheless went along with this policy and were at least grateful that the U.S. was building some kind of wall to protect them from the Godless aggressors to the north. The high point of this policy was perhaps when the Iranian Army rushed to Oman's defense against South Yemen insurgency and with CIA assistance backed a major Kurdish revolt against its classic rival, the Baathist Government in Iraq.

